



Tips para securizar correctamente un router.

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Lima, Perú.





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- ❖ Consultora en Telecomunicaciones
- ❖ Establecida en 2008
- ❖ Principales actividades
 - ❖ Soporte IT
 - ❖ Entrenamientos Oficiales



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

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- ❖ Diseño, desarrollo e implementación de soluciones.
- ❖ Incidencias puntuales.
- ❖ Soporte mensual (OutSourcing).
 - ➔ Revisión y Optimización
 - ➔ Actualización
 - ➔ Mantenimiento preventivo
 - ➔ Monitoreo
 - ➔ Asesoramiento
 - ➔ Soporte Prioritario
 - ➔ Guardia 24x7
 - ➔ Implementaciones Adicionales





- ❖ Entrenamientos Públicos y Privados.
- ❖ Coordinador del programa MikroTik Academy





NETWORK ONLINE

98.23%

↑ Online **222** | ↓ Offline **4**

TOTAL DEVICES

226

⚠ Warning **3** | ⏸ Timeout **4** | ⚠ No Login **0**

TOTAL PORTS &

76419

📡 Sensors **73147** | 📡 Ports **3230** | ➕ Add Options **42**

EVENTS UNREAD

2

⚠ With Warning Status **2**

CONFIG HISTORY

1450

👁 Monitoring Devices **1**

DISK USAGE

54%

📁 Files Backups **21537** | 💾 Disk Backups **27G**

Oraculo Server Status

Date	Uptime	License	Status	Bot Telegram	WebService
2018-04-11 14:30:28	14:30:28	OUTSOURCING	VALID_LICENSE	OK	OK

# CPU info	CPU avr	Memory	Mem Used	Disk System	Disk Used
3 Cores - Virtual a7769a6388d5	2.61 1.92 1.91	3.9 GiB	95%	59 GiB	56%

Overview (1 Hour)

Device	AV 1h	RTT	PL	Downs	Alarms	Reboot	PF	Important
██████████	0%	0 ms	100%	0	0	0	0	4
██████████	0%	0 ms	99.97%	0	0	0	0	4
██████████	0%	0 ms	99.97%	0	0	0	0	4
██████████	0%	0 ms	98.21%	0	0	0	0	2
██████████	95.729%	331.52 ms	20.7%	15	0	0	0	2

GeoMAPs Category

[ZoomOut](#)

Made for **MikroTik**

Leaflet | Oraculo - Map data © OpenStreetMap contributors, CC-BY-SA, Imagery Mapbox

Last Devices Timeout

Device	Category	Last Seen	Last Probe	Status
██████████		40 minutes ago	44 minutes ago	Timeout
██████████	ion S.A.	20 hours ago	20 hours ago	Timeout
██████████		March 28	March 28	Timeout
██████████	gentina	March 27	March 27	Timeout

Last Events

When	Device	Event	Variable	Before	Actual
⚠ 8 min	██████████	bgp	Change value for peer Cache de Facebook BGP	connect	active
⚠ 13 min	██████████	bgp	Change value for peer Cache de Facebook BGP	active	connect
⚠ 18 min	██████████	bgp	Change value for peer Cache de Facebook BGP	connect	active
⚠ 23 min	██████████	bgp	Change value for peer	active	connect





- ❖ Compartir experiencias
- ❖ Introducir el concepto de los ataques.
- ❖ Hablar sobre *vulnerabilidades en sistemas operativos*.
- ❖ Introducir el concepto de Firewall.
- ❖ Segurizar un router en 3 etapas simples.
- ❖ DEMO en vivo!





Los ataques tienen principalmente 2 objetivos:

- ❖ Tomar el control del router.
- ❖ Provocarle una denegación de servicios (CPU al 100%, consumo de todo el ancho de banda, reinicios, etc).
- ❖ Más comunes:
 - » *Escaneo de Puertos / PSD.*
 - » *BruteForce SSH / Telnet / WEB*
 - » *Vulnerabilidades & Exploits*
 - » *ICMP Flooding*
 - » *Ataques de Syn Flooding*
 - » *UDP Amplification*
 - » *DDoS / IP Spoofing*



❖ Existen bases de datos públicas que recolectan información de todos los hosts del mundo!

SHODAN


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Exploits
 Maps
Share Search
 Download Results
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TOTAL RESULTS

5,400

TOP COUNTRIES



Peru	5,400
-------------	-------

TOP CITIES

Lima	2,553
Arequipa	402
Ica	103
Trujillo	64
Chimbote	40

TOP SERVICES

190.236.166.154

Telefonica del Peru
Added on 2019-02-04 11:44:09 GMT
■ ■ Peru, Lima

```

                220 firewall FTP server (MikroTik 6.38.5) ready
                530 Login incorrect
                500 'HELP': command not understood
                500 'FEAT': command not understood
            
```

181.176.221.127

Viettel Perú S.a.c.
Added on 2019-02-04 11:42:01 GMT
■ ■ Peru

```


                HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden
                Content-Length: 1135
                Content-Type: text/html
                Date: Mon, 04 Feb 2019 11:42:01 GMT
                Expires: Mon, 04 Feb 2019 11:42:01 GMT
                Server: Mikrotik HttpProxy
                Proxy-Connection: close
            
```

181.176.215.42

Viettel Perú S.a.c.
Added on 2019-02-04 11:20:37 GMT
■ ■ Peru

```

                Firmware: 1
                Hostname: Core Minera Paraiso SAC
                Vendor: MikroTik
            
```

Exploits

mikrotik



TOTAL RESULTS

17

PLATFORM

hardware	12
windows	2
php	2
linux	1

TYPE

remote	7
dos	6
webapps	4

AUTHOR

FarazPajohan	4
ShadOS	2
Lorenzo Santina	2
xis_one	1

MikroTik RouterOS - sshd (ROSSSH) Remote Heap Corruption

kingcope

remote

... During an audit the Mikrotik RouterOS sshd (ROSSSH) has been identified to have a remote previous to

Exploitation of this vulnerability will allow full access to the router device.

This analysis describes the bug and includes a way to get ...

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Exploitation of this vulnerability will allow full access to the router device.

This analysis describes the bug and includes a way to get ...

Mikrotik Syslog Server for Windows 1.15 - Denial of Service (Metasploit)


xis_one

dos 514

... # Exploit Title: Mikrotik Syslog Server for Windows - remote BOF DOS

Date: 19.04.2013

Exploit Author: xis_one@STM Solutions



Exploits

cisco



TOTAL RESULTS

250

SOURCE

exploitdb	245
metasploit	5

PLATFORM

hardware	139
windows	50
multiple	15
jsp	5
asp	5

TYPE

remote	100
dos	71
webapps	53
local	21

Cisco ASA 8.x - 'EXTRABACON' Authentication Bypass

remote 161

```
... # Exploit Title: Cisco ASA 8.X Authentication Bypass
# Date: 17-08-2016
# Exploit Author: Equation Group
# Vendor Homepage: Cisco
# Software Link: Cisco
# Version: Cisco ASA 8.X
# Tested on: Cisco ASA 8.4.2
# CVE : Not sure
```

Requirements:
 * SNMP read (public) string
 * Access to SNMP service
 * SSH port accessible

Full Exploit:
<https://github.com/offensive-security/exploitdb-bin-splotts/raw/master/bin-splotts/40258.zip> ...

Cisco ASA 8.x - 'EXTRABACON' Authentication Bypass

Shadow Brokers

remote 161

```
... # Exploit Title: Cisco ASA 8.X Authentication Bypass
# Date: 17-08-2016
# Exploit Author: Equation Group
```



- ❖ Tener el router **LO MAS SEGURO POSIBLE!**
- ❖ Mantener actualizado el sistema operativo.
- ❖ Implementar reglas de firewall (INPUT) para controlar el acceso al router.





MKE
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Hay muchas maneras de hacerlo, según conveniencia:

- ❖ Actualización manual (descargar, subir, reiniciar).
- ❖ Actualización centralizada (System → Autoupgrade).
- ❖ The DUDE / NetInstall
- ❖ Actualización por consola:
/tool fetch url=https://www.mikrotik.com...
- ❖ System → Packages → Check For Updates





1 System

2 Packages

3 Check For Updates

4 Channel: current

5 Download&Install

Package List

Name	Version	Build Time
routeros-mipsbe	6.43.8	Dec/21/2018 07:10:42

Check For Updates

Channel: current

Installed Version: 6.42.7

Latest Version: 6.43.8

What's new in 6.43.8 (2018-Dec-21 07:10):

MAJOR CHANGES IN v6.43.8:

!) telnet - do not allow to set "tracefile" parameter;

Changes in this release:

- *) bridge - fixed IPv6 link-local address generation when auto-mac=yes;
- *) capsman - fixed "group-key-update" parameter not using correct units;
- *) crs3xx
- *) console
- *) dhcpv4
- *) dhcpv6
- *) ethernet
- *) gps - a
- *) led - fi
- *) led - fi
- *) lte - disallow setting LTE interface as passthrough target;
- *) lte - fixed DHCP IP acquire (introduced in v6.43.7);
- *) lte - fixed passthrough functionality when interface is removed;
- *) lte - increased reported "rsrq" precision;
- *) lte - reset USB when non-default slot is used;
- *) package - use bundled package by default if standalone packages are installed as well;

New version is available



- ❖ ETAPA 1: Deshabilitar los servicios que no se van a usar.
- ❖ ETAPA 2: Implementación de un firewall simple que sólo permita el acceso a los servicios a las IP que estén dentro de una **lista blanca**.
- ❖ ETAPA 3: ¿Cómo hacer que mi IP caiga en esa lista blanca?





❖ Los servicios son las diferentes puertas de ingreso a RouterOS. Es altamente recomendable deshabilitar todos aquellos servicios que no se usen en nuestro router.

❖ IP → Services

The image shows two windows from the RouterOS WinBox interface. The left window, titled 'IP Service List', displays a table of services. The right window, titled 'IP Service <winbox>', shows the configuration for the 'winbox' service. A red arrow points from the 'winbox' entry in the list to the configuration dialog.

	Name	Port	Certificate
X	● api	8728	
X	● api-ssl	8729	none
X	● ftp	21	
	● ssh	22	
X	● telnet	23	
	● winbox	8291	
	● www	80	
X	● www-ssl	443	none

The configuration dialog for 'winbox' shows:

- Name: winbox
- Port: 8291
- Available From: (dropdown menu)

Buttons: OK, Cancel, Apply, Disable

MUM Etapa 2: Firewall Simple (parte I)



- ❖ Las direcciones IP que estén en la lista “admin” tendrán acceso a los servicios habilitados (SSH, WEB y WinBox).

New Firewall Rule

General Advanced Extra Action Status

Chain:

Src. Address:

Dst. Address:

Protocol: 6 (tcp)

Src. Port:

Dst. Port: 22,80,8291

New Firewall Rule

General Advanced Extra Action Status

Src. Address List: admin

Dst. Address List:

Layer7 Protocol:

Content:

Connection Bytes:

New Firewall Rule

General Advanced Extra Action Status

Action:

Log

Log Prefix:





- ❖ Todas las direcciones IP restantes tendrán los servicios cerrados.

New Firewall Rule

General Advanced Extra Action Statistics

Chain: input

Src. Address:

Dst. Address:

Protocol: 6 (tcp)

Src. Port:

Dst. Port: 22,80,8291

New Firewall Rule

General Advanced Extra Action Statistics

Action: drop

Log

```
/ip firewall filter  
add action=accept chain=input dst-port=22,80,8291 protocol=tcp  
src-address-list=admin  
add action=drop chain=input dst-port=22,80,8291 protocol=tcp
```



Firewall												
Filter Rules												
#	Action	Chain	Src....	Ds...	Prot...	Src. Port	Dst. Port	Src. Add...	Bytes	Packets		
0	✓ acc...	input			6 (tcp)		22,80,8291	admin	0 B	0		
1	✗ drop	input			6 (tcp)		22,80,8291		2000 B	32		

Firewall				
Address Lists				
Name	Address	Timeout	Creation Time	

❖ ¿Porque sigo dentro del router si el firewall está funcionando y (aún) no estoy dentro de la lista blanca?



❖ Port Knocking!

- ❖ Técnica usada para “golpear” el router con una secuencia de puertos sólo conocida por el administrador.
- ❖ Al finalizar la secuencia en el orden correcto, la IP del administrador deberá caer en la lista blanca indicada anteriormente.
- ❖ Hasta que esto no suceda, los servicios estarán cerrados.





New Firewall Rule				
General	Advanced	Extra	Action	Statistics
Chain:	input			
Protocol:	<input type="checkbox"/> 6 (tcp)			
Src. Port:				
Dst. Port:	<input type="checkbox"/> 20000			

New Firewall Rule				
General	Advanced	Extra	Action	Statistics
Src. Address List:				
Content:				
Connection Bytes:				
Connection Rate:				

New Firewall Rule				
General	Advanced	Extra	Action	Statistics
Action:	add src to address list			
Address List:	temp1			
Timeout:	00:05:00			

New Firewall Rule				
General	Advanced	Extra	Action	Statistics
Chain:	input			
Protocol:	<input type="checkbox"/> 6 (tcp)			
Src. Port:				
Dst. Port:	<input type="checkbox"/> 10000			

New Firewall Rule				
General	Advanced	Extra	Action	Statistics
Src. Address List:	<input type="checkbox"/> temp1			
Content:				
Connection Bytes:				
Connection Rate:				

New Firewall Rule				
General	Advanced	Extra	Action	Statistics
Action:	add src to address list			
Address List:	temp2			
Timeout:	00:05:00			

New Firewall Rule				
General	Advanced	Extra	Action	Statistics
Chain:	input			
Protocol:	<input type="checkbox"/> 6 (tcp)			
Src. Port:				
Dst. Port:	<input type="checkbox"/> 30000			

New Firewall Rule				
General	Advanced	Extra	Action	Statistics
Src. Address List:	<input type="checkbox"/> temp2			
Content:				
Connection Bytes:				
Connection Rate:				

New Firewall Rule				
General	Advanced	Extra	Action	Statistics
Action:	add src to address list			
Address List:	admin			
Timeout:	01:00:00			



Firewall												
Filter Rules												
NAT Mangle Raw Service Ports Connections Address Lists Layer7 Protocols												
+ - [check] [x] [filter] 00 Reset Counters 00 Reset All Counters Find input												
#	Action	Chain	Src....	Ds...	Prot...	Src. Port	Dst. Port	Src. Add...	Bytes	Packets		
0	✓ acc...	input			6 (tcp)		22,80,8291	admin	0 B	0		
1	✗ drop	input			6 (tcp)		22,80,8291		2000 B	32		
2	☑ ad...	input			6 (tcp)		20000		0 B	0		
3	☑ ad...	input			6 (tcp)		10000	temp1	0 B	0		
4	☑ ad...	input			6 (tcp)		30000	temp2	0 B	0		


❖ Ahora sólo resta enviarle paquetes al router en la secuencia definida anteriormente para que nuestra IP caiga en la lista blanca definida.






```
MacBook-Pro-de-Mario:~ marioclep$ telnet 192.168.88.241 20000
Trying 192.168.88.241...
telnet: connect to address 192.168.88.241: Connection refused
telnet: Unable to connect to remote host
MacBook-Pro-de-Mario:~ marioclep$ telnet 192.168.88.241 10000
Trying 192.168.88.241...
telnet: connect to address 192.168.88.241: Connection refused
telnet: Unable to connect to remote host
MacBook-Pro-de-Mario:~ marioclep$ telnet 192.168.88.241 30000
Trying 192.168.88.241...
telnet: connect to address 192.168.88.241: Connection refused
telnet: Unable to connect to remote host
```

Name	Address	Timeout	Creation Time
D admin	192.168.88.246	00:59:30	Feb/04/2019 17:...
D temp1	192.168.88.246	00:04:21	Feb/04/2019 17:...
D temp2	192.168.88.246	00:04:27	Feb/04/2019 17:...






- ❖ Una alternativa es trabajar con VPN, y al conectarse, agrega la IP a la lista admin.






- ❖ Deshabilitar MAC-Telnet y MAC-Winbox (Tools > Mac Server).





❖ Vienen muchas aplicaciones de Port Knocking para cualquier S.O.!





- ❖ Hay muchas maneras de proteger un router, algunas más simples, otras más complejas, pero **en todas hay que usar el Firewall.**
- ❖ Mantener actualizado RouterOS cierra las vulnerabilidades que van apareciendo.
- ❖ La técnica mostrada anteriormente sólo cierra el acceso al router, protegiendo los ataques que tienen como objetivo tomar el control del equipo. Sin embargo, hay otros ataques que sólo tienen intención de provocar una denegación de servicio, que requieren otro tipo de tratamiento y configuraciones.





¿Preguntas?

MUCHAS GRACIAS!

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